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ANTITRUST LAW: INDIRECT PURCHASER
STANDING TO SUE IN OKLAHOMA
MAJOR V MICROSOFTCORP.
-

KEITH D. TRACY* & RONALD L. WALKER**

Deciding an issue of first impression in Oklahoma, the Oklahoma Court of
Civil Appeals ruled in Majorv. Microsoft Corp.' that an indirect purchaser of
a product does not have standing to sue for antitrust damages that might have
resulted during the commercial distribution of that product.2 The court's
ruling is based on federal law precedent and is one of the first appellate
opinions interpreting and applying the relatively new Oklahoma Antitrust
Reform Act.3
Part I of this Article briefly summarizes the Oklahoma Antitrust Reform
Act. Next, Part HI explains the historical context of the Major v. Microsoft
Corp. decision, including a brief history of the antitrust litigation against
Microsoft Corporation. Part III addresses the indirect purchaser rule adopted
in Major v. Microsoft Corp. Part IV then discusses exceptions to the indirect
purchaser rule asserted in the case. Finally, Part V evaluates the effect of this
decision to prevent "end-runs" around the indirect purchaser rule by asserting
claims under the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act.
. Oklahoma Antitrust Reform Act
Enacted on July 1, 1998, the Oklahoma Antitrust Reform Act revamped
Oklahoma's antitrust statutes, which had remained relatively unchanged since
statehood.4 Oklahoma antitrust law originated in the Oklahoma Constitution,

* Attorney, Chaparral Energy, L.L.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Adjunct Professor,
Oklahoma City University School of Law. B.S., Oklahoma State University, 1993; J.D.,
Oklahoma City University, 1996. The author was counsel to Microsoft Corporation in the
Major v. Microsoft Corp. lawsuit resulting in the court opinion addressed herein.
** Attorney, Walls Walker Harris & Wolfe, P.L.L.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. B.A.,
Phillips University, 1976; J.D., University of Oklahoma, 1979. The author was counsel to
Microsoft Corporation in the Major v. Microsoft Corp. lawsuit resulting in the court opinion
addressed herein.
1. 2002 OK CIV APP 120, 60 P.3d 511.
2. Id. 9,11,60P.3dat513.
3. 79 OKLA. STAT. §§ 201-212 (2001).
4. Oklahoma state antitrust law originated in Oklahoma laws 1907-08, pp. 75-57, and were
subsequently recodified and amended a number of times. See, e.g., OKLA. CoMP. LAWS
§§ 8809-8812 (1909); OKLA. REV. LAWS §§ 8220-8244 (1910); OKLA. COMP. STAT. §§ 11,017-
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which not only prohibits monopolies, 5 but also authorizes the state legislature
to define each "combination, monopoly, trust, act, or agreement, in restraint
of trade" that should be declared unlawful.6 Much of American antitrust law
is founded on federal antitrust statutes, in particular the Sherman Act, 7 the
Robinson-Patman Act,8 and the Clayton Act. 9 Despite their enactment early
in the last century, however, many of these federal antitrust principles were
difficult to reconcile with the pre-1998 language of the Oklahoma antitrust
statutes. Consequently, the Oklahoma legislature enacted the Oklahoma
Antitrust Reform Act, which made significant changes to state antitrust law.
A primary feature of the Antitrust Reform Act is that it seeks to conform
Oklahoma's antitrust law to federal antitrust law by incorporating federal law
to the greatest extent possible.'" In fact, the Oklahoma legislature has
affirmatively mandated that "[tihe provisions of this act shall be interpreted
in a manner consistent with Federal Antitrust Law ... and the case law
applicable thereto.""
II. The Context of Major v. Microsoft Corp. and a BriefHistory of Antitrust
LitigationAgainst Microsoft
A. Government Cases
The Microsoft antitrust litigation beginning in the 1990s is well
documented.' 2 In 1994, the federal government charged Microsoft with
violating § 1 and § 2 the Sherman Antitrust Act for allegedly unlawfully
maintaining a monopoly in the market for operating systems designed to run
on Intel-compatible personal computers and purportedly using anticompetitive

11,053 (1921); OKLA. STAT. §§ 12,790-12,826 (1931); 79 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1-103 (1991).
5. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 32.
6. Id. art. V, § 44.
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).
8. Id. §§ 13-13b, 21a.
9. Id. §§ 12, 13, 14-19, 20, 21-27; 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (2000).
10. One notable distinction is that the Oklahoma equivalent of § 1 of the Sherman Act also
prohibits "[elvery act.., in restraint of trade or commerce within this state." 79 OKLA. STAT.
§ 203 (2001). By including the word "act," Oklahoma law is arguably broader than its federal
law counterpart. See Harolds Stores, Inc. v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 82 F.3d 1533, 1549-51
(10th Cir. 1996).
11. 79 OKLA. STAT. § 212.
12. See, e.g., Microsoft Legal Newsroom, at http://www.niicrosoft.com/presspass/
legalnews.mspx (last visited Aug. 4, 2005); Dep't of Justice Antitrust Case Filings, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/msindex.htm (last visited Aug. 4, 2005).
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terms in its licensing and software developer agreements.13 Microsoft and the
federal government resolved their dispute through entry of a consent decree. 4
In 1997, the federal government commenced a civil contempt proceeding
contending that Microsoft had violated the consent decree by marketing a
single, tied product consisting of an operating system called Windows 95 and
the Microsoft web browser, Internet Explorer. 5 Although the trial court
denied the government's requested relief, it issued a preliminary injunction
against the purportedly illegal "tie-in."' 6 On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded because the trial court had
decree and issued the preliminary
incorrectly interpreted the consent
17
injunction without adequate notice.
In May 1998, one month before the appellate court ruling involving the
consent decree, the federal government and a group of approximately twenty
states filed separate lawsuits against Microsoft alleging antitrust claims for
(1) violating § 1 of the Sherman Act through exclusive dealing and tying
Internet Explorer to Windows 95 and Windows 98, and (2) violating § 2 of the
Sherman Act by maintaining its monopoly in the personal computer operating
systems market and attempting to monopolize the web browser market. 8 The
trial court entered findings of fact 9 and conclusions of law 20 against
Microsoft, both under federal law and the respective state laws raised by the
nonfederal, government plaintiffs. In April 2000, as a remedy for the antitrust
violations, Judge Jackson ordered Microsoft to modify its conduct and
structurally reorganize, including a mandatory divesture that would split the
company into separate operating systems and applications businesses.2'

13. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1451 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Microsoft 1).
14. When the trial court refused to enter the decree, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 159
F.R.D. 318, 338 (D.D.C. 1995), both parties successfully appealed, Microsoft I, 56 F.3d at
1455, and the consent decree was ultimately entered, United States v. Microsoft Corp., Civ. A.
94-1564, 1995 WL 505998, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 1995).
15. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 980 F. Supp. 537, 538 (D.D.C. 1997).
16. Id. at 543.
17. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (MicrosoftII).
18. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 45 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Microsoft II).
When the case was placed on the court's "fast-track" docket, the parties were limited to fourteen
witnesses at trial, direct testimony had to be submitted in writing, and a seventy-six-day bench
trial was commenced in October 1998, only five months after the complaints had been filed.
19. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 12 (D.D.C. 1999) (entering findings
of fact on November 5, 1999, with subsequent amendments on December 21, 1999).
20. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35 (D.D.C. 2000).
21. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 64 (D.D.C. 2000).
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Microsoft appealed the trial court's decision both on the merits and for
judicial bias.22
On appeal, the en banc D.C. Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part.23
On remand, Judge Kollar-Kotelly ordered the parties to enter into intensive
settlement negotiations .24 The United States and some of the states were able
to reach a compromise with Microsoft, 25 which the trial court approved after
altering the continuing jurisdiction provision in the consent decree to allow
the court to act sua sponte.26 On June 30, 2004, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the
approval of the consent decree.27
B. Consumer ClassAction Cases
With the appeal pending on Judge Jackson's April 2000 final order,
litigants filed an onslaught of consumer class action lawsuits against
Microsoft across the country.2 8 These lawsuits - grounded on the trial
court's ruling against Microsoft - quoted many of the findings of fact and
conclusions of law in the federal government's case.2 9 Microsoft settled

22. Microsoft II, 253 F.3d at 46. While this appeal was pending, the plaintiff-states
petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari, but the Court declined to hear the direct
appeal, denied the petition for writ of certiorari, and remanded. United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 530 U.S. 1301 (2000).
23. Microsoft II, 253 F.3d at 118-19. The court agreed that Microsoft had indeed used
anticompetitive means to maintain its monopoly in the operating system market, but rejected the
contention that Microsoft attempted to monopolize the internet browser market. Id. at 84. The
court also vacated and remanded the Sherman Act tying violations for failing to conduct a rule
of reason analysis, id., and the remedy portion of the final judgment, id. at 98. Finally, the court
determined that the trial court's integrity was called into question because of Judge Jackson's
ex parte contacts with the media, id. at 115, and required the case be reassigned to a different
trial court judge on remand, id. at 117.
24. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144, 150 (D.D.C. 2002).
25. Id. The nonsettling states pursued the remanded action, where Microsoft had been
adjudicated as unlawfully maintaining a monopoly in violation of the Sherman Act. New York
v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.D.C. 2002).
26. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 215 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15 (D.D.C. 2002); see also
Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d at 202.
27. Massachusetts v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004). For sometime, the
parties will make periodic reports to the trial court regarding compliance with the final
judgments in both the settled and nonsettled cases. Antitrust Case (U.S.): Settlement
Proceedings, at http://microsoft.com/presspass/legal-newsroomarchive.mspx?case=settlement
%20proceedings (last visited Aug. 4, 2005).
28. See Joe Wilcox, Microsoft Whittles Away at Class-Action Suits, at http://news.com.
con/2100-1001_3-243545.html (last visited Aug. 4, 2005).
29. See, e.g., Petition 11 3, 27, 29, Major v. Microsoft Corp., 2002 OK CIV APP 120, 60
P.3d 511 (No. CJ-2000-1704); Amended Petition (N 3, 27, 29, Major (No. CJ-2000-1704).
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consumer class actions in approximately fifteen jurisdictions.3 ° In total, over
130 putative private consumer class actions were filed against Microsoft under
federal and state antitrust laws after Judge Jackson issued his findings of
fact.3' At least one lawsuit was filed in virtually every state. Two were filed
in Oklahoma.
1. Prentice v. Microsoft Corp.
On April 5, 2000, only two days after Judge Jackson announced his
conclusions of law, a statewide consumer class action case was filed against
Microsoft in the Western District of Oklahoma asserting that Microsoft
violated § 1 and § 2 of the Sherman Act and section 203 of the Oklahoma
Antitrust Reform Act.32 The putative class was defined as "all Oklahoma
owners of Windows 95 and Windows 98 software which contain Internet
Explorer. 33 Because approximately sixty of the antitrust lawsuits filed
against Microsoft were in federal courts across the county, the multidistrict
litigation procedure was invoked and these cases - including the Prentice
case - were transferred to the U.S. District Court for the District of
35
Maryland. 34 The district court ruled that Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois barred
36 and subsequently granted
the federal law claims asserted in Prentice,
37
lawsuit.
Microsoft's motion to dismiss the state law claims in the Prentice

30. Microsoft Consumer Class Action Settlement, at http://www.microsoft.com/mscorp/
legal/class/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2005). For an example of a state consumer class action
settlement, see Microsoft-California Class Action Settlement, at http://www.microsoftcal
settlement.com (last visited Aug. 4, 2005).
31. See Wilcox, supra note 28.
14, 18, Prentice v. Microsoft Corp., No. CIV-00-00690 (W.D. Okla.
32. See Complaint 9191
filed Apr. 5, 2000) [hereinafter Prentice Complaint].
33. Id. at 3; Amended Complaint at 3, Prentice,No. CIV-00-00690 (W.D. Okla. filed Apr.

26, 2000).
34. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000); Initial Transfer Order, In re Microsoft Antitrust Litig.,
No. MDL 1332 (D. Md. Apr. 25, 2000); Conditional Transfer Order, In re Microsoft Antitrust
Litig., No. MDL 1332.
35. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
36. PrenticeComplaint, supra note 32.

37. Memorandum Order at 3-4, In re Microsoft Antitrust Litig., No. MDL 1332 (D. Md.
Jan. 23, 2003) (applying Major v. Microsoft Corp., 2002 OK CIV APP 120, 1 9, 60 P.3d 511,
513, in which the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held that the holdings of Illinois Brick
apply to claims brought under the Oklahoma Antitrust Reform Act, and recognizing Major as
controlling law in Oklahoma on the matter).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2004
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2. Major v. Microsoft Corp.
On the same day Prenticewas filed in federal court in Oklahoma, Majorv.
Microsoft Corp. was filed in the state district court for Tulsa County. In
Major, the plaintiff alleged, on behalf of a statewide class of Microsoft
consumers, that Microsoft had violated the Oklahoma Antitrust Reform Act
and had imposed an unconscionable contract price in violation of title 12A,
section 2-302 of the Oklahoma Uniform Commercial Code regarding contracts
for the sale of goods."a
Arguing that the Illinois Brick indirect purchaser rule applied, Microsoft
moved to dismiss the antitrust claims.39 Judge Gregory K. Frizzell agreed and
granted Microsoft's motion to dismiss. 40 The plaintiff filed an amended
petition, which contained new allegations of purported exceptions to the
indirect purchaser rule as well as a claim under the Oklahoma Consumer
Protection Act. 4' Judge Frizzell again dismissed the action, 42 and on appeal,
the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, adopting the district court's
order of dismissal.4 3 The antitrust rulings contained in the appellate court
ruling are analyzed below.
IlL. The Indirect PurchaserRule
A. FederalLaw
Under Illinois Brick, indirect purchasers do not have standing to assert a
private cause of action for damages under federal antitrust law.' Only those
who purchase directly from an alleged antitrust violator can recover damages
under federal law.45 In Illinois Brick, the State of Illinois and 700 local
governmental entities in the Chicago area sued several concrete block
manufacturers for price fixing in violation of the Sherman Act.46 The

38. Major v. Microsoft Corp., 2002 OK CIV APP 120, 1 2, 60 P.3d 511, 512. The UCC
claim was ultimately dismissed because UCC section 2-302 does not provide a basis for
affirmative relief, but only serves as a defense to a claim for relief. Id. 1 11, 60 P.3d at 517.
39. Id. 3, 60 P.3d at 512; see Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 729.
40. Major 11, 60 P.3d at 513.
41. Id. 2, 60 P.3d at 512.
42. Id. 3, 60 P.3d at 512.
43. Id. 1 11, 60 P.3d at 513 (concluding that Judge Frizzell's opinion had so adequately
explained the rationale for dismissing the amended petition that the appellate court should adopt
Judge Frizzell's order as its own) (citing OKLA. SUP. CT. R. 1.202).
44. II. Brick, 431 U.S. at 729.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 726.
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manufacturers had sold concrete blocks to certain masonry contractors, who
in turn used those blocks to construct buildings later sold to the plaintiffs.47
The plaintiffs alleged that the manufacturers conspired to fix the prices of
their concrete blocks and at least part of those overcharges had been "passed
on" by the middlemen to the plaintiffs.48
The trial court granted summary judgment to the concrete block
manufacturers because the plaintiffs had not purchased anything directly from
the manufacturers but were merely indirect purchasers.49 While the plaintiffs
successfully appealed the case to the Seventh Circuit," the U.S. Supreme
Court reversed." The Court held that "the overcharged direct purchaser, and
not others in the chain of manufacture or distribution, is the party 'injured in
his business or property' within the meaning of [§ 4 of the Clayton Act]. 52
The Court rested its conclusion on two principal rationales: (1) attempting to
determine the amount of overcharge passed on to the consumers would make
antitrust litigation even more complex, protracted, and expensive; and
(2) concentrating the potential recovery in the direct purchasers, rather than
dissipating it among indirect purchasers with small claims, would increase the
effectiveness of the use of private actions to enforce the antitrust laws. 3
Regarding the first rationale, the Court explained that holding otherwise
would allow "potential plaintiffs at each level in the distribution chain.., to
assert conflicting claims to a common fund - the amount of the alleged
overcharge - by contending that the entire overcharge was absorbed at that
particular level in the chain."54 Such a holding would also compel defendants
to take discovery on and possibly defend conflicting claims for damages
asserted by participants at every level in the distribution chain, which "would
greatly complicate and reduce the effectiveness of the already protracted
treble-damages proceedings." 55 The Court stated:
Permitting the use of pass-on theories under § 4 essentially would
transform treble-damages actions into massive efforts to apportion
the recovery among all potential plaintiffs that could have absorbed
part of the overcharge - from direct purchasers to middlemen to

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id. at 726-27.
Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 67 F.R.D. 461, 468 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 536 F.2d 1163, 1166-67 (7th Cir. 1976).
Ill.
Brick, 431 U.S. at 729.
Id.
Id. at 745.
Id. at 737.
ld. at 732.
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ultimate consumers. However appealing this attempt to allocate
the overcharge might seem in theory, it would add whole new
dimensions of complexity to treble-damages suits and seriously
undermine their effectiveness. 6
Under the second rationale, the Illinois Brick Court noted that allowing
indirect purchasers to have standing, especially in consumer actions, would
mean that "[ifn treble-damages actions by ultimate consumers, the overcharge
would have to be apportioned among the relevant wholesalers, retailers, and
other middlemen ... . The Court concluded that "[t]he legislative purpose
in creating a group of 'private attorneys general' to enforce the antitrust laws
under § 4" - a purpose shared by the Oklahoma Antitrust Reform Act - was
"better served by holding direct purchasers to be injured to the full extent of
the overcharge paid by them than by attempting to apportion the overcharge
among all that may have absorbed a part of it." 8
The U.S. Supreme Court has reaffirmed Illinois Brick on multiple
occasions.59 In Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc.,' the Court emphasized the
simplicity and force of the indirect purchaser bar imposed by Illinois Brick.6 '
UtiliCorpconcerned an alleged conspiracy among natural gas producers to
inflate prices for natural gas sold to utilities.62 Among the plaintiffs were the
States of Kansas and Missouri, which asserted antitrust claims on behalf of
consumers in their states who purchased gas from those utilities.6 3 Kansas and
Missouri argued that even though the consumers were indirect purchasers of
the gas from the defendant-producers, the indirect purchaser rule should not
apply because state regulations required the utilities to pass on the entire
amount of the overcharge to the consumers. 4 The Court nevertheless refused

56. Id. at 737.
57. Id. at 740.
58, Id. at 746 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251,
262 (1972)). The Illinois Brick indirect purchaser rule is based upon, and is a corollary to, the
rule articulated in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494
(1968) (rejecting the "pass on" defense as a matter of law and holding that a direct-purchaser
defendant cannot introduce evidence that indirect purchasers actually absorbed a portion of the
overcharge).
59. See, e.g., Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199, 207 (1990) (stating that the
antitrust plaintiff must be the "immediate buyer[] from the alleged antitrust violator[]").
60. 497 U.S. 199 (1990).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 204.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 208.
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to create an exception to the indirect purchaser rule.65 After describing the
policies behind Illinois Brick, the Court stated that "even assuming that any
economic assumptions underlying the Illinois Brick rule might be disproved
in a specific case, we think it an unwarranted and counterproductive exercise
to litigate a series of exceptions. 66
Illinois Brick has been applied in federal courts in the Tenth Circuit,
including those in Oklahoma. For example, the Tenth Circuit has affirmed a
district court's application of the indirect purchaser rule to prohibit a
consumer class action antitrust claim from being pursued by indirect
purchasers. In Hise v. Philip Morris Inc.,67 a putative class of tobacco
consumers sued the major tobacco manufacturers claiming that the
manufacturers had conspired to cover the costs of the settlement of state
medicaid reimbursement litigation by raising the price of their tobacco
products. 68 Because the tobacco products in question were sold only to
distributors and not directly to consumers, thereby making the consumers
indirect purchasers, the federal district judge rejected the antitrust claim, a
ruling the Tenth Circuit ultimately affirmed.69
B. Oklahoma Law
Major v. Microsoft Corp. held for the first time in Oklahoma that the
indirect purchaser rule applies to bar antitrust claims for damages by a
plaintiff who did not purchase the product in question directly from the
defendant.7 ° This ruling follows the Oklahoma legislative mandate that state
courts interpret the Oklahoma Antitrust Reform Act consistently with federal
law.7 '

Id. at 208-18.
Id. at 217.
46 F. Supp. 2d 1201 (N.D. Okla. 1999), aff'd, 208 F.3d 226 (10th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1208.
Id. at 1207. The court noted:
IllinoisBrick and its progeny make clear that only direct purchasers, and no others
in the chain of manufacture and distribution, have standing to bring an action for
damages under the federal antitrust laws. Plaintiffs' attempts to distinguish this
case lack merit, and the Court concludes that, as indirect purchasers of tobacco
products, Illinois Brick bars their claim for damages here.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
70. 2002OKCIVAPP 120, 9, 11, 60P.3d511,513.
71. See 79 OKLA. STAT. § 212 (2001) (noting that "[t]he provisions of this act shall be
interpreted in a manner consistent with Federal Antitrust Law... and the case law applicable
thereto") (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). "When intent of legislature is plainly
expressed in a statute, it must be followed without further inquiry." Estate of Kasishke v. Okla.
Tax Comm'n, 1975 OK 133, 18, 541 P.2d 848, 851. Courts in other states with similar
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
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Even before the legislature enacted title 79, section 212, however,
Oklahoma courts interpreted the state antitrust statutes in light of federal
statutes and case law because of the similarity of the state and federal antitrust
statutes.72 Since its adoption, a federal court in another jurisdiction has
interpreted the Oklahoma Antitrust Reform Act to bar indirect purchasers
from having standing.73
Moreover, when Oklahoma passed its Antitrust Reform Act in 1998, it
automatically incorporated and codified the Illinois Brick indirect purchaser
rule because federal antitrust statutes were adopted almost verbatim in the
Oklahoma Antitrust Reform Act.74 Thus, unlike some other states, Oklahoma
has chosen not to legislatively overturn the indirect purchaser rule.75
In Major, the plaintiff had purchased his copies of Windows 98 from a
computer manufacturer and a national retailer, not from Microsoft.7 6 The vast
majority of Microsoft sales of Windows 98 are to computer manufacturers
who incorporate the product into computers.7 7 The computers and stand-alone
operating systems are sold in many different venues, such as mail-order
catalogs, large department stores, and computer specialty stores. 78 They are
sold in a wide variety of packages with other hardware and often with
maintenance or consulting services. 79

statutes have also relied on Illinois Brick and barred indirect purchaser actions. See, e.g.,
Stifflear v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 931 P.2d 471, 475-76 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996); Abbott
Labs., Inc. v. Segura, 907 S.W.2d 503, 505-07 (Tex. 1995); Blewett v. Abbott Labs., 938 P.2d
842, 845-46 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
72. See Teleco, Inc. v. Ford Indus., Inc., 1978 OK 159, 1 3, 587 P.2d 1360, 1362 ("[T]he
provisions of this State's antitrust statutes are similar to Federal legislation, and that
interpretation of Federal antitrust legislation provides valuable assistance in interpreting the
provisions of the Oklahoma statutes.").
73. FrC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25, 50 (D.D.C. 1999), modified on other
grounds, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999) (holding that the State of Oklahoma may not sue to
recover damages on behalf of indirect purchasers).
74. "Judicial interpretation by a court oflast resort impressed on adopted legislation before
its reception cannot be changed by jurisprudence of the receiving state. Legislative process
affords the only effective means for departure from the binding force of the [adopted statute]."
In re Estate of Speake, 1987 OK 61, 7, 743 P.2d 648, 650.
75. Attempts to modify the rule have failed. See S. 48-450, 1st Sess. (Okla. 2001) (vetoed
by Governor Frank Keating on April 11, 2001); S. 49-232, 1st Sess. (Okla. 2003) (not reported
out of the House Judiciary Committee).
76. Major v. Microsoft Corp., 2002 OK CIV APP 120, 1 1, 60 P.3d 511, 512.
77. Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Brief at
9, Major (No. CJ-2000-1704) [hereinafter Defendant's Reply Brief in Major].
78. Id.
79. Id.
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Some putative class members in Major bought their copies from local
stores, thus interposing not just one, but two or three layers in the chain of
purchases.8" In addition, one of Major's copies of Windows 98 was sold as
a component of a computer - which was by far the most common method of
purchasing Windows 98 - further exacerbating the difficulty of determining
the incidence and amount of any alleged overcharge. 8 '
The Major court considered whether two words in the Oklahoma
Act - "any person" - meant that antitrust standing is available to everyone,
including indirect purchasers.82 The plaintiff in Major argued that the word
"any" disclosed a legislative intent to allow "every" person, including indirect
purchasers, to recover for state antitrust violations.83 These same two words,
however, appear in the federal antitrust statute,' and it was these very words
that the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted and applied in Illinois Brick to
preclude suits by indirect purchasers.85
The plaintiff in Major sought to avoid the Illinois Brick rule by asserting
that "[als a precondition to their first use of Windows 98," the putative class
members were required "to accept and agree to an end user license... directly
from Microsoft."86 Even if true, this allegation had no bearing on Major's
standing. The end user license agreement protects Microsoft's rights under
federal copyright laws and ensures that its software is not pirated or used
improperly.87 The plaintiff did not pay anything to Microsoft for the license
and, as a result, the license was irrelevant to the "passing on" issues of Illinois

80. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Brief at 9, Major (No. CJ-2000-1704).
81. Id.
82. Major v. Microsoft Corp., 2002 OK CIV APP 120,17, 60 P.3d 511, 513 (looking to
79 OKLA. STAT. § 205(A)(1) (2001)).
83. Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Brief at 8, Major(No. CJ-20001704) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Response Brief in Major].
84. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000) ("any person who shall be injured in his business
or property"), with 79 OKLA. STAT. § 205(A)(1) ("[any person who is injured in his or her
business or property").
85. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720,729 (1977). Moreover, the Supreme Court had
already rejected the interpretation advocated by the plaintiff, ruling that "[ilt is reasonable to
assume that Congress did not intend to allow every person tangentially affected by an antitrust
violation to maintain an action to recover threefold damages for the injury to his business or
property." Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 (1982) (emphasis added).
86. First Amended Class Action Petition for Damages 7, Major (No. CJ-2000-1704)
[hereinafter Amended Petition]. The plaintiff appeared to be unusual in this respect because the
vast majority of licenses for Windows 98 were entered into between end users and computer
manufacturers, not with Microsoft directly.
87. See Defendant's Reply Brief in Major, supra note 77, at 8 n.12.
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Brick.88 The plaintiff in Major was an indirect purchaser because he paid
nothing to Microsoft for Windows 98.
The Major plaintiff also argued that the indirect purchaser rule should not
apply to a "unique injury." This "injury" was actually an alleged injury to the
market as a whole, specifically denial of "technical innovation, market choice,
product variety and substitutable supply."89 Such allegations were repeatedly
rejected in the Microsoft antitrust litigation because a consumer lacks standing
to claim injury to the market as a whole.9" The other purported "unique
injury" was that Microsoft's integration of a browser into Windows 98
allegedly resulted in performance degradation as compared to a hypothetical
operating system without the browser.91 The court in Major determined this
was simply a claim that the plaintiff should have obtained a better product
than he did,92 which circled back to the problems identified in Illinois Brick.
The trial court in Major also considered and rejected Major's argument that
he was a direct purchaser.93 Although the plaintiff had not paid anything
directly to Microsoft, he argued that he was a direct purchaser because some
or all of the money paid to third parties for software was ultimately paid to
Microsoft. 94 If a direct purchase is one where the price is not directly paid but
rather is ultimately paid to the manufacturer, then no purchase could ever be
considered an indirect purchase. Direct purchasers are only those who are
"the immediate buyers from the alleged antitrust violators."95 The fact that the
plaintiff had a direct contractual relationship with Microsoft through the end
user license agreement was also of no consequence because there was no
direct payment to the defendant for that license.96

88. Id.
89. Amended Petition, supra note 86, 1 80.
90. E.g., In re Microsoft Antitrust Litig., 127 F. Supp. 2d 702, 710-14 (D. Md. 2001).
91. Plaintiff's Response Brief in Major, supra note 83, at 8.
92. Major at Exhibit A, Pt. 4, 60 P.3d at 517.
93. Id. IN 10-11, 60 P.3d at 513.
94. Plaintiff's Response Brief in Major, supra note 83, at 12.
95. Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199, 207 (1990).
96. End user license agreements do not make the plaintiffs "direct buyers" and do not
change the operative fact that "[n]o money passed directly from Plaintiffs to Defendant."
Arnold v. Microsoft Corp., No. 00-CI-00123, 2001 WL 193767, at **1, 6 (Ky. Cir. Ct. July 21,
2000). "Plaintiffs are indirect purchasers under Illinois Brick. That Plaintiffs have entered into
Daraee v.
end-user license agreements with Defendants does not change this status ....
Microsoft Corp., No. 004-3311, 2000 WL 33187306, at *1 (Or. Cir. Ct. June 27, 2000).
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IV. Alleged Exceptions to the IndirectPurchaserRule
The U.S. Supreme Court in Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc. admonished
that it would be "an unwarranted and counterproductive exercise to litigate a
series of exceptions" to Illinois Brick.97 Despite the Court's clear guidance,
litigants have argued for exceptions to the Illinois Brick doctrine, but none
have ever been accepted by the Supreme Court. The overwhelming majority
of federal courts that have considered possible exceptions since UtiliCorp
have declined to apply them. 98 Major v. Microsoft Corp. and the antitrust
litigation nationwide against Microsoft, including the multidistrict litigation
court, 99 was no different in terms of litigating and rejecting the so-called
"exceptions."
The plaintiff in Majorunsuccessfully argued for three purported exceptions
to Illinois Brick, including: (1) purchases from a member of a vertical price
fixing conspiracy; (2) purchases from an entity "owned or controlled" by the
antitrust violator; and (3) instances in which the retailer that sells to the
plaintiff is required to pass all costs on to the end user pursuant to a
preexisting, cost-plus, fixed-quantity contract. 10o
A. Vertical PriceFixing Conspiracy
The court in Major analyzed whether the plaintiff had alleged a vertical
conspiracy of price fixing between Microsoft and Windows 98 retailers from
whom indirect purchasers bought their products, such as Office Depot and
Gateway. 0 l However, the plaintiff failed to meet the requirement of alleging
the existence of a vertical conspiracy or "facts sufficient to sustain such an
allegation. '0 2 As such, the Majorcourt decided the argument to be nothing
more than "a transparent attempt to evade the rule of Illinois Brick."'' 3
The plaintiff in Major also alleged a separate vertical conspiracy, one
where Microsoft allegedly conspired to fix prices with three computer

97. UtiliCorp, 497 U.S. at 217.
98. See, e.g., Lucas Auto. Eng'g v. Bridgestone/Firestone, 140 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir.
1998); In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 605-06 (7th Cir.
1997); McCarthy v. Recordex Servs., Inc., 80 F.3d 842, 852-55 (3d Cir. 1996).
99. The multidistrict litigation court hearing all of the cases pending in federal court
rejected the exact language regarding the IllinoisBrick exceptions that the plaintiff offered here.
In re Microsoft Antitrust Litig., 127 F. Supp. 2d 702, 710-14 (D. Md. 2001).
100. Major v. Microsoft Corp., 2002 OK CIV APP 120, TI 10-11, 60 P.3d 511, 513.
101. Id. at Exhibit A, Pt. 1, 60 P.3d at 515.
102. Jewish Hosp. Ass'n v. Stewart Mech. Enters., 628 F.2d 971, 977 (6th Cir. 1980).
103. Id.; Major at Exhibit A, Pt. 1, 60 P.3d at 515.
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manufacturers: Compaq, Dell, and NEC.1 4 The court also rejected these
allegations because: (1) Major did not purchase directly from any of the
alleged coconspirators, but instead purchased from Office Depot and
Gateway; 10 5 (2) none of the alleged coconspirators were joined as defendants
in the Major case, failing to satisfy a requirement of every federal appellate
court that has considered the proposed vertical conspiracy exception; 06 (3) the
conclusory allegations lacked supporting facts; 0 7 and (4) the antitrust claims
asserted were economically implausible and were equally consistent with
competitive conduct. 8
The validity of any vertical conspiracy exception is particularly doubtful
because it is not even mentioned as a possibility in the Illinois Brick
opinion.' °9 Moreover, those courts that have considered the exception have
made clear that the rationale for it would be that an individual who purchases
an overpriced good from a member of a price fixing conspiracy bears that
overcharge directly and, therefore, pass on would not be at issue." 0
B. Ownership or Control
The ownership or control exception, suggested as a possible exception in
a footnote in Illinois Brick,"' has never been definitively accepted." 2 Even

104. Amended Petition, supra note 86, "1 10-11.
105. Major at Exhibit A, Pt. 1, 60 P.3d at 515.
106. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Recordex Servs., Inc., 80 F.3d 842, 854-55 (3d Cir. 1996); In
re Midwest Milk Monopolization Litig., 730 F.2d 528, 529-30 (8th Cir. 1984); In re
Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 691 F.2d 1335, 1342 (9th
Cir. 1982); In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1163 (5th Cir. 1979).
107. The "vertical conspiracy" exception has only been applied to cases in which the
manufacturer and middlemen jointly conspired to fix the price charged by the middlemen to
their customers. See Gas-A-Tron v. Am. Oil Co., No. 73-191, 1977 WL 1519, at *2 (D. Ariz.
Dec. 7, 1977) (holding that only claims that coconspirators "fixed the prices at which plaintiffs
purchased" - not the price at which suppliers purchased - are sufficient to survive Illinois
Brick).
108. In re Microsoft Antitrust Litig., 127 F. Supp. 2d 702, 705-08 (D. Md. 2001).
Economically implausible antitrust claims supported only by conclusory allegations are
regularly dismissed for failure to state a claim. See, e.g., DM Research Inc. v. Coll. of Am.
Pathologists, 170 F.3d 53, 56 (1st Cir. 1999); TV Communications Network, Inc. v. Turner
Network Television, Inc., 964 F.2d 1022, 1026 (10th Cir. 1992).
109. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 605 (7th Cir.
1997) ("UtiliCorpimplies that the only exceptions to the IllinoisBrick doctrine are those stated
in Illinois Brick itself.").
110. See, e.g., In re Mid-Atl. Toyota Antitrust Litig., 516 F. Supp. 1287, 1295 (D. Md.
1981); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 486 F. Supp. 115, 119 (D. Minn. 1980).
111. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 n.16 (1977).
112. See Comes v. Microsoft Corp., No. CL 82311, 2000 WL 33176061, at *6 (Iowa D. Ct.
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if courts recognized such an exception, it would only apply when the antitrust
defendant exercises pervasive control over intermediaries, including the prices
charged to end users." 3
In Major, neither the plaintiff nor the putative class could establish that
Microsoft owned or controlled Office Depot or Gateway, the two companies
from whom Major purchased Windows 98.114 The plaintiff did allege,
however, that an end user license agreement with Microsoft was "substantially
similar, if not identical" to those between Microsoft and middlemen
suppliers.11 5 Yet, the court found this allegation had nothing to do with
ownership or control.1 16 Control over the terms of the license agreement did
not imply any control over the price charged to end users.117 Other
jurisdictions hearing Microsoft antitrust cases similarly rejected this
contention.' 18
C. PreexistingCost-Plus Contract
In Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court appeared to create a preexisting costplus contract exception to the indirect purchaser rule.11 9 Relying on the
Court's language in Illinois Brick, the plaintiff in Major argued that the
transaction between Microsoft and its original equipment manufacturers was
the "functional equivalent" of a preexisting cost-plus contract.12 Even if such

July 11, 2000). Courts that have considered it have held that it is to be narrowly construed and
have rarely found it applicable. See, e.g., Jewish Hosp. Ass'n v. Stewart Mech. Enters.,
628 F.2d 971, 975 (6th Cir. 1980) (noting that IllinoisBrick emphasized the "narrow scope of
exemptions to the indirect-purchaser rule").
113. In re Microsoft Antitrust Litig., 127 F. Supp. 2d at 713 (holding that the absence of
allegation of control over price is "fatal"). Unless the control extends to the price charged for
operating systems or computers, the "[p]roblems of proving the amount of the pass-on remain
undiminished." Jewish Hosp. Ass'n, 628 F.2d at 975. Indeed, the control exception is limited
to cases where one party "owns or exerts such significant control over [another] as to be
virtually the same entity." Fisher v. Wattles, 639 F. Supp. 7, 9 (M.D. Pa. 1985) (emphasis
added); see also In re BrandName PrescriptionDrugs, 123 F.3d at 605-06.
114. See In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1162 (5th Cir. 1979) (rejecting
the plaintiffs' assertion of the "control" exception because the "plaintiffs in these suits have
never suggested that the grocery chains 'controlled' the packers or slaughterhouses").
115. Amended Petition, supra note 86, 1 60.
116. Major v. Microsoft Corp., 2002 OK CIV APP 120, Exhibit A, Pt. 2, 60 P.3d 511,516.
117. Differential pricing does "nothing to convert the two-step transaction into the equivalent
of a single sale." Jewish Hosp. Ass'n, 628 F.2d at 975. "Charging different prices to different
direct purchasers stands in contradiction to the concept of there being effectively only one
transaction between Microsoft and Plaintiffs." Comes, 2000 WL 33176061, at *7.
118. See, e.g., Comes, 2000 WL 33176061, at **12-13.
119. 11. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977).
120. Majorat Exhibit A, Pt. 3, 60 P.3d at 516.
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an exception exists, it arises only when a customer is committed to buying a
fixed quantity of goods regardless of price, and the supplier is insulated from
any decrease in sales volume when it attempts to pass on a manufacturer's
overcharge. 121
The Major court rejected this argument for two primary reasons. First, the
plaintiff in Major failed to allege the requisite preexisting cost-plus
contract.122 If a seller's desire to recover its costs and a "competitive rate of
return" on its investment resulted in a "cost-plus contract," the exception to
Illinois Brick would swallow the rule.
Second, UtiliCorprang the death knell of the cost-plus exception, and no
federal appellate court has since embraced it. 123 In UtiliCorp, the Supreme
Court rejected application of such an exception even where the law required
the direct purchaser utilities to pass on 100% of any alleged overcharge. 24 if
the legally required 100% pass on in UtiliCorp did not qualify as a25cost-plus
contract, then certainly the Microsoft situation would not qualify.
V. No "End-Runs" Around the Indirect PurchaserRule in Oklahoma
The amended petition in Major asserted a new legal theory - a cause of
action under the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act. 126 The alleged unfair
and deceptive trade practices supporting the consumer protection claim
consisted of exactly the same conduct underlying the plaintiffs antitrust
claim. 127 Nevertheless, the Major court dismissed the consumer protection
28
law claim for failure to state a claim.
The court in Majorheld that the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act does
not extend to unfair methods of competition. 129 Statutory interpretation
supports the court's ruling. Section 753 of the Oklahoma Act contains a list

121. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 736.
122. Major at Exhibit A, Pt. 3, 60 P.3d at 517.
123. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Recordex Servs., Inc., 80 F.3d 842,855 (3d Cir. 1996) ("[T]he
vitality of the 'pre-existing cost-plus contract' exception is doubtful... in light of UtiliCorp.");
Illinois ex rel. Burris v. Panhandle E. Pipeline Co., 935 F.2d 1469, 1478 (7th Cir. 1991) ("The
[Supreme] Court's interpretation of the cost-plus exception appears so narrow... as to preclude
its application in any case.").
124. Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199 (1990).
125. See Comes v. Microsoft Corp., No. CL 82311, 2000 WL 33176061, at *7 (D. Ct. Iowa,
July 11, 2000) ("This allegation by its terms does not contain the certainty required by
UtiliCorp.").
126. MajorJ 2, 60 P.3d at 512.
127. Amended Petition, supra note 86, 92.
128. Major at Exhibit A, Pt. 6, 60 P.3d at 517-18.
129. Id.
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of specific prohibited practices and a catch-all bar against "unfair or deceptive
trade practice[s]."' 3 ° The specifically enumerated activities are violations of
other named statutes or involve deception or misleading conduct, neither of
which has anything to do with anticompetitive behavior. Under ordinary
principles of statutory construction, courts should interpret the catch-all phrase
at the end of the list of specifically enumerated conduct to be limited to
conduct of the same type as the list."'
In addition, the Oklahoma legislature seemingly intended to exclude unfair
methods of competition from the scope of the statute. When the legislature
adopted the consumer protection statute in 1972, it had available to it various
model consumer protection statutes.13 1 In particular, the Federal Trade
Commission had promulgated three forms of a model consumer protection or
unfair trade practice statute: (1) "Alternative Form No. 1" prohibiting "unfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices"; (2)
"Alternative Form No. 2" that referred only to "false, misleading, or deceptive
acts or practices" without a reference to unfair methods of competition; and
(3) "Alternative Form No. 3" that referred only to "unfair or deceptive" acts
or practices without a reference to unfair methods of competition.' 3 3 The
commentary accompanying these model forms explained that Alternative
Form No. 1 was intended to reach "not only deceptive practices which prey
upon consumers, but also unfair methods which injure competition," giving
as examples price fixing arrangements, boycotts by suppliers, and "other trade
restraints which tend to create monopoly and enhance prices.' ' 134 Alternative
Form No. 3, which included a list of twelve particular deceptive practices
in
along with a catch-all provision, was described as "somewhat narrower 135
scope than the language of either Alternative No. 1 or Alternative No. 2."'
The Oklahoma legislature modeled its statute on Alternative Form No. 3.
The Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act as enacted includes ten of the twelve
specific deceptive practices, as well as several others, and the catch-all bar on
"unfair and deceptive trade practices," with no reference to "unfair methods
of competition." 136 The legislature also refused to adopt a provision contained

130. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 753 (2001).
131. See Nucholls v. Bd. of Adjustment of the City of Tulsa, 1977 OK 3, 6,560 P.2d 556,
558-59.
132. See Patterson v. Beall, 2000 OK 92, 27, 19 P.3d 839, 846.
133. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 142 (1970) [hereinafter
SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION].

134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 15 OKLA. STAT. §§ 752(11), 752(12), 753(20) (2001).
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in all three model forms, calling for the statute to be interpreted together with
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 137 which had long banned unfair methods
of competition and had been construed to reach conduct that violated the
Sherman Antitrust Act.138 Instead, the legislature chose to leave the regulation
of anticompetitive conduct to the then-existing antitrust laws. 39 This
interpretation is consistent with decisions in states with similar statutes."
Another reason supporting the court's rejection of the consumer protection
law claim is that the statutory policy of harmonizing state and federal antitrust
law would be nullified if indirect purchasers whose claims were barred under
the antitrust laws were permitted to assert a claim under consumer protection
laws.' 4 ' It would eviscerate the legislative mandate of harmonizing Oklahoma
antitrust law with federal law if the Illinois Brick rule could be avoided by
pleading a violation of the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act. Statutory
provisions must be reconciled, as far as practicable, to make them consistent
and harmonious.' 42 Other rules of statutory interpretation compel the same
result. 4 3 A different result would mean that virtually every antitrust claim
137. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2000).
138. See Boos v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 925 F. Supp. 49, 54 (D. Mass. 1996); SUGGESTED
STATE LEGISLATION, supra note 133; see also Marshall A. Leaffer & Michael H. Lipson,
ConsumerActions Against UnfairorDeceptive Acts orPractices: The PrivateUses of Federal
Trade Commission Jurisprudence,48 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 521, 560-64 (1980) (surveying
consumer protection laws in all states and showing Oklahoma's as one of the narrowest).
139. 79 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1-7, 21-36, 81-87 (repealed July 1, 1998).
140. Courts in other jurisdictions with consumer protection or unfair trade practice statutes
that do not include prohibitions of "unfair methods of competition" have construed this
legislative omission as evincing an intent to exclude antitrust violations from the statute's reach.
See, e.g., Abbott Labs., Inc. v. Segura, 907 S.W.2d 503, 513 (Tex. 1995) (Gonzales, J.,
concurring) ("[N]o amendment to the [Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection
Act] . . . indicates any subsequent legislative intent to expand the [Act] to encompass
price-fixing and monopoly claims. (Of course, there would be no need to do so, since the
[Texas] Antitrust Act serves this purpose.)").
141. Major v. Microsoft Corp., 2002 OK CIV APP 120, Exhibit A, Pt. 6, 60 P.3d 511, 517.
142. Sharp v. Tulsa County Election Bd., 1994 OK 104, 1 11, 890 P.2d 836, 840; see also
Riley v. Cordell, 1948 OK 125, 18, 194 P.2d 857, 860 (interpretations of state statutes must
be "reasonable ... and in keeping with the public policy of this state"). The policies underlying
Illinois Brick - such as avoiding multiple liability for the same conduct and the excessive
expense, delay, and complexity necessarily involved in apportioning damages among multiple
levels of the distribution chain - are fully applicable whether the plaintiff labels his claims as
antitrust violations, UCC unconscionability claims, or unfair and deceptive trade practices.
143. A general statute is controlled by a specific statute that clearly includes the matter in
controversy. Carter v. City of Okla. City, 1993 OK 134, 11, 862 P.2d 77, 80. The Oklahoma
Consumer Protection Act is a statute of general application covering a wide range of commercial
conduct, but the Oklahoma Antitrust Reform Act is aimed at a narrower class of anticompetitive
conduct and the matter in controversy is clearly covered by the substantive scope of that law.
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could be labeled as a consumer protection claim, and Illinois Brick could be
skirted.
Courts in other states with federal law harmonization provisions have also
refused to permit an "end-run" around Illinois Brick through consumer
protection or similar statutes. For example, in Vacco v. Microsoft Corp., the
Connecticut state court held that permitting claims barred by Illinois Brick to
be asserted under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act "would be
contrary to United States Supreme Court authority.. . and would undermine
of federal antitrust
the Supreme Court's policy choices in its interpretation
145
law, which this court is directed to follow.'
This new rule of law in Oklahoma has potential for greater application.
Only future judicial decisions will reveal just how far this "no end-run"
principle extends. Three possible extensions of this holding are that (1) any
antitrust allegations that are not legally cognizable under antitrust principles
cannot be the basis for a valid consumer protection claim, regardless of
whether the antitrust claim is barred under Illinois Brick or some similar rule
of law; (2) any antitrust allegations that are not recognized under antitrust law
cannot form the basis for any other cause of action; and (3) nonantitrust
claims, such as claims for deceptive trade practices, that are legally deficient
may not be recognized under the consumer protection laws either.
VI. Conclusion
Majorv. Microsoft Corp.incorporates and applies the IllinoisBrick indirect
purchaser rule in Oklahoma, soundly rejects purported exceptions to the
indirect purchaser rule, and discards any effort to recast legally deficient
antitrust claims as a valid consumer protection act cause of action. This
watershed case will likely be cited for decades to come as the rule of law in
Oklahoma on indirect purchaser standing.

Likewise, where two statutes conflict, the later-enacted statute controls over the earlier. Duncan
v. City of Nichols Hills, 1996 OK 16, U 26-29, 913 P.2d 1303, 1310. Because the Oklahoma
Consumer Protection Act was enacted in 1972, and amended in 1988 to create a private right
of action, the interpretation of that provision is controlled by the Oklahoma Antitrust Reform
Act, which was not enacted until 1998.
144. No. X06CV000160064S, 2000 WL 1683386 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 10, 2000).
145. Id. at *6.
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